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danger of conflicting remedies seems greatly diminished by the
present attitude of the NLRB. Perhaps the only disturbing
element in this opinion is the Court's attempt to establish a standard
to determine when a case will be directed to the NLRB. The
court's criterion demands that a dispute be channeled to the NLRB
if it involves a substantial question in an area in which the NLRB
has expressed its peculiar expertise. Such an ad hoc standard
may give rise to two difficulties. Firstly, determining whether the
NLRB has displayed its expertise in a given area may result in
close questions for which the courts have no rigid guide. Secondly,
since the NLRB has demonstrated its expertise in those areas in
which it would have exclusive jurisdiction were it not for a contract breach, it may be that such a criterion will create a kind of
pre-emption by judicial fiat. If the latter be true, the doctrine
of concurrent jurisdiction propounded by the court may be more
academic than real.
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titioner, United Mine Workers of America, brought a representation
proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board during the
insulated period of a current collective bargaining agreement between the intervenor, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, and the employer. The petitioning union alleged that
the contract was not a bar to an election by the employees who
were seeking another representative because the union-security
provision did not on its face conform to the requirements of Section
8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board, overruling major portions of its previously devised Keystone rule, held
that since the union-security clause was not clearly unlawful it
would constitute a bar to a representation election. Paragon
Prods. Corp., 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. (LAB. REL.) (CCH N.L.R.B.)
ff10657 (Nov. 28, 1961).
however, on March 3, 1962, the United States Supreme Court, in Local 174,
Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 82 Sup. Ct. 571, 576-77 (1962), unequivocally declared that federal labor law must be applied in labor cases
litigated in state courts. Since the federal viewpoint on concurrent jurisdiction is still unsettled (see text accompanying note 15 supra), this ruling
on the supremacy of federal labor law does not necessarily mean that the
outcome of the principal decision would have been changed.
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The NLRA provides for a representation election when employees wish to replace their existing representative. 1 It was
recognized, however, that to permit an election at any time during
a contract term would not promote labor-management harmony or
protect the parties from "raiding" by rival unions.2 In order to
maintain stability in labor relations, therefore, the Board found
it necessary to formulate a general policy which prohibited a
representation election during the term of a currently operative
collective bargaining agreement.3
A significant exception to this general policy arose with respect to contracts containing union-security clauses, i. e., provisions
requiring union membership as a condition of continued employment. 4 Basically, such provisions have been held not to bar
a representation election if they expressly and unambiguously require the employer to give preference to union members in hiring,
laying off, or for purposes of seniority.5 Neither will such clauses
constitute a bar if they specifically withhold from nonunion employees, or new employees, the statutory thirty-day grace period
within which they are not required to join the union. 6 Furthermore, such clauses will not bar an election if they expressly
condition continued employment upon the payment of sums of
money other
than the "periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly
'7
required."

The distinction between clearly invalid union-security clauses
and those which are merely ambiguous has created problems in
the application of the above-mentioned exception. In 1948, the
Board, in C. Hager & Sons Hinge Mfg. Co.,8 prevented a clearly
'Labor

Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)

§9(c)(1),

61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1958).
2See Daykin, The Contract as a Bar to a Representative Election,
10 LAB. L.J. 219 (1959); Freidin, The Board, the "Bar," and the Bargain,
59 CoLum. L. REv. 61, 63 (1959).

3 National Sugar Ref. Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1939), is apparently the
first case to allow a contract to bar an election. This seems to have been
a reversal of the former view which permitted employees to change their

representative at any time during the contract term.

See New England

Transp. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 130 (1936).
4 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a) (3), 61
Stat. 140-41 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1958), contains the statutory
requirements for a valid union-security provision. Other types of contracts
that will not bar a representative election are: (1) contracts not representative of all the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit; (2)
contracts terminable at the will of the parties; (3) contracts executed before
any employees are hired. See Daykin, supra note 2, at 220-21, 230.
5Paragon Prods. Corp., 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. (LAB. RFL) (CCH
N.L.R.B.) 1110657 (Nov. 28, 1961).
Keystone Coat, Apron & Towel
Supply Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 880, 883-84 (1958).
6Ibid.
7Ibid.

8 80 N.L.R.B. 163 (1948).
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invalid union-security clause from barring an election. The Board
did not concern itself with the question of whether the illegal
provision had actually been used to compel immediate union
membership or to circumvent the statutory grace period, and held
that the mere existence of the clause was a sufficient restraint upon
the employees' rights to prevent the contract from being a bar
to the election. 9 The rationale of Hager was followed in subsequent cases where the Board took the position that clearly
unlawful provisions would not bar an election unless there was
a deferral or saving clause which clearly manifested an intent to
defer their application until such time as they might lawfully
,become effective.10
At the same time, however, the Board utilized a different
approach when dealing with disputes arising from ambiguous unionsecurity clauses, i. e., clauses susceptible of two interpretationsSeveral decisions clearly esone lawful, the other unlawful.
tablished that the Board, in construing the meaning of ambiguous
union-security clauses, could consider extrinsic evidence and look
both to the circumstances under which they were adopted and
In addition, when
the practice of the parties under them."
allegedly ambiguous union-security clauses were involved, the Board,
in A. Sandler Co.,12 took the position that it was not necessary
that all the safeguards provided for in the statute be expressly
incorporated into the agreement-thereby holding that "technical
omissions" were permitted. 13 A further reflection of the liberal
policy adopted with respect to such clauses was seen in the fact
that, where alternative interpretations were possible, the Board
presumed that the4 parties intended to comply with the requirements of the law.1
This early policy was severely criticized by Member Rodgers
in a dissenting opinion in A. Sandler Co.' 5 He felt that a
union-security clause, which did not clearly conform to the statutory
standards, served "as a potent instrument of coercion" against
individual employees no matter what an examination of extrinsic

9Ibid.

10 Northwest Magnasite Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 85 (1952); American Dyewood
Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 78 (1952); Wyckoff Steel Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 1318
(1949).
11 Regal Shoe Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1078 (1953); Bath Iron Works Co.,
101 N.L.R.B. 849 (1952); 0. B. Andrews Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 59 (1949).
The majority
Compare Hess, Goldsmith & Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1009 (1952).
of the Board in Hess, however, did not feel that the clause in issue was
ambiguous.
12110 N.L.R.B. 738 (1954).
13 Ibid.; accord, Regal Shoe Co., supra note 11.
14Humboldt Lumber Handlers, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 393, 395 (1954).
'5 110 N.L.R.B. 738, 740 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
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evidence showed. 16 Therefore, by allowing the contract to bar
an election, he argued that the Board was really approving this
use of coercion. Furthermore, in answer to the argument that a
representation proceeding should not be concerned with specific
charges involving protection of employees' rights under section
8(a) (3), since Congress has provided a remedy in an adversary
unfair labor practice action, this dissent stated:
As a practical matter, unfair labor practice charges are not likely to be
filed unless an unlawful union-security clause is actually enforced by discharge or other penalty. Meanwhile, the restraint against employees embodied
in this contract is allowed to continue. By the majority decision herein,
unions and employers are encouraged to execute illegal union-security provisions, for they are assured that their unlawful action, though grounds
for a possible
unfair labor practice case, will be otherwise overlooked or
7
condoned.'

The rationale behind the dissent in Sandler was adopted in
1958 when the Board made substantial changes in its contractbar rules.' 8 In Keystone Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co.,19 the
Board felt that the former view had a tendency to contribute to
the undermining of the freedom of choice which is guaranteed
by the act to the individual employees. Thus, the Board flatly
stated that it would deny any bar effect to a collective birgaining
agreement which contained a union-security clause that did not
on its face conform to the requirements of the act.2 0 This meant
that for contract-bar purposes the union-security provisions must
provide for an explicit grant to all old nonunion employees of
the statutory thirty-day grace period within which they were not
required to join the union. On the other hand, the Board maintained that the contract must not provide a clause that contained
an agreement to defer, rescind, or amend the effectiveness of the

union-security provision. Furthermore, in order to have the contract bar an election, the use of ambiguous language was absolutely
forbidden. 21 Finally, to accomplish the desired result, and in order
to prevent the protraction of these representation hearings, the
Board decided that it would be better to exclude the introduction
22
of any extrinsic evidence on the meaning of the clause in issue.
Thus, Keystone established a clear and simple rule that was to be

16 Id.at 741.
17 Ibid.
18 See Freidin, The Board, the "Bar," and the Bargain, 59 COLUM. L. Rlv.
61, 79 (1959).
19
20 121 N.L.R.B. 880, 884 (1958).
Id.at 883. The Board also ruled that a provision declared unlawful
in an
2 unfair labor practice case would not be a bar.
Id.at 884.
22
Id.at 886.
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mechanically applied in 23every representation case dealing with a
union-security provision.

Several cases subsequent to Keystone indicate just how rigidly
has applied this administrative rule. In Aurora Gasoline
the Board
24
Co.,

a union-security clause did not explicitly grant to all non-

union employees the statutory thirty-day grace period. The Board
held that this clause would not bar an election-despite the fact
that all the employees were already union members. In Food
Haven, Inc., 25 an amendment was written into a pre-1958 contract

so that it would conform to the Keystone rule. Nevertheless,
this contract was held not to be a bar. It might well be speculated
that such rulings prompted the modification of Keystone in the
principal case.26
In the present case, the Board has decided once again to
evaluate the principles underlying its contract-bar policy. The
majority based its rejection of part of the Keystone rule on several
considerations.
First, the Board regarded the Keystone doctrine as contrary
to certain principles set forth by the United States Supreme Court.
In an unfair labor practice case, the Court has indicated that,
unless the contract was unlawful on its face, it should not be
presumed that the union and employer intended to violate federal
law.2 7

Indeed, the Court stated:

[I]n the absence of provisions calling explicitly for illegal conduct, the
contract cannot be held illegal because it failed affirmatively to disclaim all
illegal objectives. 28
See Friedin, supra note 18, at 79.
128 N.L.R.B. 37 (1960).
25 126 N.L.R-B. 666 (1960).
26See Paragon Prods. Corp., 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. (LAB. REL.) (CCH
N.L.R.B.) f 10657, at 16502 (Nov. 28, 1961). However, it should be noted
that at least on one occasion, the Board gave a liberal interpretation to
Keystotw. In Zangerle Peterson Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1959), the Board
stated that even though the contract at one point made reference to a
requirement that membership in good standing according to the union
constitution and bylaws was necessary for continued employment, this would
not prevent the contract from being a bar since a reading of the contract
in its entirety revealed the conformity with the act.
27NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961), wherein the Court
would not presume that a foreman, who was a union member, in charge of
hiring would discriminate against nonunion job applicants.
28 Id. at 699; accord, Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S.
667, 676 (1961); see NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S.
71, 79 (1953), where the Court, while overruling the Board's contention that
an invalid union-security clause automatically invalidates the whole contract,
said: "The employment contract should not be taken out of the hands
of the parties themselves merely because they have misunderstood the legal
limits of their bargain, where the excess may be severed and separately
condemned as it can here." See also RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS §236(a)
(1932).
23
24
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Secondly, the Board was of the opinion that the Keystone rule
led to the anomaly of presuming the contract illegal in a representation proceeding, but declaring it perfectly lawful in an unfair
labor practice case.2 9 Thus, for example, in the Aurora case, the
failure to provide for the thirty-day grace period rendered the
contract illegal so as to permit a representation. proceeding, while
this same failure would not of its'elf constitute an unfair labor
practice.
In addition, it was stated that "certain objectionable effects
of the Keystone decision as reflected by the Board's experience" 30
required some modifications of the rule. The Board pointed out,
moreover, that the Keystone rule had an extremely "unsettling"
influence upon established collective bargaining relations in view
of the fact that a substantial bulk of the contracts containing
union-security provisions could not meet this strict test.
The Board retained the restrictive approach of denying the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence, but it made two significant
departures from Keystone: (1) an ambiguous union-security
clause will now bar representation proceedings unless it has been
previously declared unlawful in an unfair labor practice case;
(2) a properly executed rescission or amendment which clearly
defers the effectiveness of an unlawful clause will also bar an
election. 31
The dissenting members objected to the majority opinion on
several grounds. 32 They maintained that the Keystone rule did not
involve a presumption of illegality, but simply reflected an administrative judgment that the contract-bar doctrine should not
be invoked to deny employees the exercise of their statutory right
unless the union-security clause was clearly in conformance with the
statute. In addition, the dissent pointed out that there are other
"rules holding that a contract . . . would be no bar, even though

the reasons for holding the contract no bar could under no
circumstances form the basis for unfair labor practice findings." 33
As illustrations of this statement, the dissent referred to the typical
schism 34 and expanding unit 8. situations which would not con29 Paragon Prods. Corp., supra note 26, at 16502.
30Paragon Prods. Corp., 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. (LAB. REL.) (CCH
N.L.R.B.) 1110657, at 16502 (Nov. 28, 1961).
at 16504.
331id.
2
1d. at 16505 (dissenting opinion).
33 Id. at 16504-05 & n.15 (dissenting opinion).
34 A schism is created, for example, where the employees' disaffiiliation
from the local union is caused by a basic intra-union conflict over policy.
Since this situation leads to confusion as to the proper bargaining representative of the employees, the Board has ruled that no genuine interest of
stability would be served by barring an election. Hershey Chocolate Corp.,
121 N.L.R.B. 901 (1958).
35A substantial increase of the number of employees in a particular
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stitute bars to a representation election or amount to unfair labor
practices. Furthermore, the dissent emphasized that the Supreme
Court decisions do not necessitate a change in the Board's contractbar policy, since Congress has given the Board a wide area of
discretion in handling representation matters. 36
Both the majority and dissent recognize the same basic consideration in the formulation of contract-bar rules, namely, balancing
the dual and sometimes conflicting objectives of fostering stability
in labor relations and protecting the employees' right to select
representatives of their own choosing. Because the insertion of a
clearly unlawful union-security clause into the contract is in conflict
with the basic policy of the act, the Board's application of the
contract-bar rules has never allowed this type of clause to act
as a bar. However, in dealing with ambiguous union-security
provisions the Board had permitted the introduction of extrinsic
evidence. To the extent that this was done, it created a distortion
in the representation proceeding by turning it into a quasi-unfair
labor practice case. Keystone recognized this and rejected the introduction of extrinsic evidence. In addition, however, Keystone
established a mechanical rule that resulted in harsh decisions like
Aurora Gasoline Co. and Food Haven, Inc. Furthermore, in
certain cases Keystone placed the Board in the anomalous position
of having to declare a union-security clause illegal for bar purposes
but legal in an unfair labor practice proceeding.
The approach utilized in the present case establishes a good
working compromise between the two extremes. On the one hand,
it preserves the basic integrity of the representation proceeding by
denying the admission of extrinsic evidence, while, on the other, it
promotes the basic policy of the Board by not barring an election
if the union-security clause is clearly invalid.

unit during the contract term is referred to as an expanding unit. The
present Board rule declares that such an increase is deemed to exist if less
than thirty per cent of the present workers or if less than fifty per cent
of the present job classifications were in existence when the contract was
executed. General Extrusion Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1165 (1958).
30 Paragon Prods. Corp., supra note 30, at 16505 n.16 (dissenting opinion);
see NLRB v. Grace Co., 184 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1950), wherein the court
referred to the Board's contract-bar rule as "a procedural rule which the
Board in its discretion may apply or waive as the facts of a given case may
demand in the interest of stability and fairness in collective bargaining
agreements. The Board is not the slave of its rules." Id. at 129.

